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Abstract
We introduce an agent–based model for stock prices that reacts on investors’
market sentiment. This is a further development of a model of Cross, Grinfeld,
Lamba and Seaman [6]. The original model of Cross et al. was already good
in showing phenomena like herding of the investors or long periods of bullish as
well as bearish sentiment with relatively short transition periods in between. Our
newly developed models are furthermore capable to show trend patterns in which
sharp movements and prolonged corrections can alternate but move in the same
direction. In particular the investors’ sentiment is no longer bistable as in Cross
et al. . Furthermore price overreactions are not a priori ﬁxed and bounded as in
the predecessor model. Other stylized facts of real market data, such as fat tails
or clustered volatility can also be reproduced.
Keywords: investor psychology, herding, trend pattern, volatility clustering
1 Introduction
Models which generate realistic data of stock price evolution are extremely helpful e.g.
for testing mechanical trading systems, because the data pool thus generated is far richer
as the one at hand while backtesting. Usually models of ﬁnancial markets are based
on standard assumptions called eﬃcient market hypotheses (EMH, cf. [8]). Although
models with EMH are good for mathematical calculation and even option pricing, they
∗Funded by the Excellence Initiative of the German federal and state governments
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do not reproduce typical stylized facts of real market data. In fact, the universality
of non–Gaussian statistics in various ﬁnancial markets seems to suggest that human
psychology is the driving force for violating the EMH.
To obtain more realistic market behavior, therefore agent–based market models have
been introduced (see e.g. [2], [3], [10], [11], [12], [13], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19] ).
We particularly want to emphasize the recently introduced model for discrete time stock
price evolution by Cross et al. [6] (see also [4], [7], [5]).
In this agent based model agents react to certain tension thresholds. The ﬁrst tension
is ”cowardice”, which is stress caused by remaining in a minority position with respect
to overall market sentiment. This feature leads to herding–type behavior. The second is
”inaction”, which is the increasing desire to act or reevaluate one’s investment position
every now and then. The later tension is modeled by two thresholds where either proﬁts
or losses are realized.
Numerical simulations of the original model of Cross et al. [6] show, that the inﬂuence
of investors’ sentiment on the price building is capable to interpret several phenomena
observed in stock markets. For instance
∙ herding of the investors,
∙ long periods of bullish as well as bearish sentiment,
∙ relatively short transition periods between bullish and bearish sentiment with sharp
price adjustments.
In Figure 1 we see a typical price evolution in Cross’s model: The evolution of a ”market
price process” is printed in dark and the corresponding ”fair market price process”
evolution is printed in light. Whereas the light curve is solely news driven, the dark
curve also reacts on investors’ behavior.
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Figure 1: Simulation Cross et al. model [6]
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Investors tend to exaggerate the market price over the fair price. The light curve on the
bottom shows the ”sentiment” of the investors (close to ”−1”: bearish sentiment; close
to ”+1”: bullish sentiment).
Although sharp price adjustments during short transitions are common when investors’
sentiment changes, the model of Cross et al. [6] is nevertheless unrealistic in two points
∙ bistable sentiment,
∙ a priori ﬁxed price overreaction due to investors’ sentiment.
With bistable sentiment we mean the fact that the investors’ sentiment only switches
from bearish to bullish and then back. However typical e.g. up–trend periods allow
several sharp up–movements of the price during bullish sentiment with only minor price
corrections in between. The corrections usually last much longer than the movements.
Similarly, in down–trend periods sharp down–movements and extended minor corrections
interchange.
The a priori ﬁxed price overreaction in the model of Cross et al. [6] stems from the fact
that the maximal inﬂuence of a switch in investors’ sentiment from bearish to bullish
and vice versa is bounded. Once the investors’ sentiment has switched to, say, bullish,
no additional positive inﬂuence of the bullish sentiment on the price is possible.
To see that, we introduce the basic price adaptation process of Cross et al. [6] (without
actually stating how the investors are updated):
The state (long or short) of the 푖–th investor over the 푛–th time interval is denoted by
푠푖(푛) ∈ {±1} , 푖 = 1, . . . ,푀 , and
휎(푛) =
1
푀
푀∑
푖=1
푠푖(푛) (1)
is a measure of the ratio of long to short investors called sentiment.
The market price at the end of the 푛–th time interval is denoted by 푝(푛) and updated
via
푝(푛+ 1) = 푝(푛) ⋅ exp
(√
ℎΔ푊 (푛) + 휅Δ휎(푛)
)
, (2)
where Δ푊 (푛) is a standard Gaussian random variable that represents news and Δ휎(푛) =
휎(푛) − 휎(푛 − 1) denotes the current change of investors’ sentiment (휅, ℎ > 0 are con-
stants).
Since 휎(푛) ∈ [−1, 1], also Δ휎(푛) is bounded, and furthermore, if the majority of the
investors is say bullish (i.e. 휎(푛 − 1) is close to 1), no further upside potential of the
investors’ sentiment on the price process is possible (Δ휎(푛) ≤ 0 !).
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This is actually a proof for the two already mentioned unrealistic points: bistable senti-
ment and a priori ﬁxed price overreaction due to investors’ sentiment (see again Figure
1; the fair market process in light is obtained from (2) with 휅 = 0).
In this paper we propose two improvements to the original model of Cross et al. [6].
Both are capable to show such trend pattern in which sharp movements and prolonged
corrections can alternate but move in the same direction.
Model A. Whereas in Cross’s model investors are only allowed to switch between +1
(long) and −1 (short), our investors can accumulate arbitrary amounts of
short or long positions. We nevertheless use the average investment as
sentiment of the investors and similarly as in Cross’s model the cowardice
of the individual investor increases, in case his investment position diﬀers
from the average investment. Since these investors act pro–cyclic, we call
them traders.
Model B. Besides the traders of Model A, we here also introduce fundamental in-
vestors, which on the one hand act on a larger time scale and on the other
hand every now and then have the possibility to observe the fair market price
(at least approximately) and adjust their investment accordingly. This way
it is guaranteed that the market price will not deviate from the fair price in
the long run. Properties of fundamental investors are the following:
∙ they act anti–cyclic
∙ they are capable to observe the fair market price, at least approximately
∙ they open new positions, as the actual market price moves away from
the fair price
∙ they close positions, as the actual market price returns to the fair price
∙ they react to a ”fundamental” market sentiment
∙ their relative position opposed to other investors increases with the
distance of the actual market price to the fair market price
In both models agents are only coupled via the overall market sentiment and the market
price. We do not use inductive learning as e.g. [1]. Nevertheless our model violates
the EMH. In particular future prices are not independent of market price history as in
Markovian markets. Only when the investors’ states are added to the state space of the
system, the Markov property is regained.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our Model A together with
a variant of it all Model A* and in Section 3 we introduce our Model B together with
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a variant, Model B*. Section 4 is used to discuss statistics of sample paths reproducing
Non–Gaussian market statistics of real market data. In particular stylized facts such as
trend patterns, fat tails and clustered volatility can be reproduced. With the exception
of Model A, the simulated actual market price of our models does not deviate from the
fair market price (representing economical data) by too much. Nevertheless, all of our
models support extreme exaggerations of the actual market price compared to the fair
market price. We believe that this feature could be a ﬁrst step in understanding large
price movements of stocks or even stock indices occurring e.g. during ﬁnancial crises.
So far our models were not used for market predictions or option pricing, but that is
subject to further research.
A continuous market model obtained as limit of our discrete models as the mesh of the
time steps goes to zero seems to be very diﬃcult to get. However, comparisons with
other realistic continuous models like e.g. [9] and [14] would be desirable.
Acknowledgement. The ﬁrst author wishes to thank Christian J. Zimmer from Banco
Itau´ S.A., Sa˜u Paulo for helpful discussions on the subject.
2 The Model A
2.1 Construction of the Model
We construct a Markov chain with 5M + 2 state variables
(
푝(푛) , 푠푖(푛) , 휎(푛) , 푐푖(푛) , 푃푖(푛) , 퐾푖(푛) , 퐻푖(푛)
)
1≤ 푖 ≤푀 , 푛≥ 0
.
Here 푠푖(푛) ∈ ℤ is the state (amount of positions; long or short) of the 푖–th investor
over the 푛–th period and 휎(푛) := 1
푀
푀∑
푖=1
푠푖(푛) is a measure of the ratio of long to
short investors called market sentiment.
This ratio has to be known also from the previous time step to evaluate the ﬂuctuation
Δ휎(푛) := 휎(푛) − 휎(푛− 1) of the most recent change in market sentiment.
The actual market price 푝(푛) at the end of the 푛–th time period is updated via
푝(푛+ 1) = 푝(푛) ⋅ exp
(
훿
(√
ℎ Δ푊 (푛) + 휅Δ휎(푛)
))
, (3)
where 푍∗푛 := Δ푊 (푛) , 푛 ∈ ℕ0 , is a standard Gaussian random variable that represents
the creation of new, uncorrelated and globally available information over the period 푛.
If 훿 = 1 is used, the parameter ℎ > 0 represents the time step since VAR(푍∗푛) = 1
and the parameter 휅 > 0 is used to balance the inﬂuence of internal market dynamics
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to the generation of new market information. Accordingly, with 0 < 훿 < 1 we can
simulate smaller price movements. In the sequel we will compare the price (3) with the
”fundamental” or fair market price 푝푓(푛) obtained from (3) by setting 휅 = 0, i.e.
푝푓(푛+ 1) = 푝푓 (푛) ⋅ exp
(
훿
(√
ℎΔ푊 (푛)
))
. (4)
To update the price in (3) we need to know Δ휎(푛) and thus the investors states 푠푖(푛).
The update of those states is described below. The fact that 푝(푛) reacts on Δ휎(푛) can
be justiﬁed as a result of the law of supply and demand.
We introduce the tension states (cowardice level) 푐푖(푛) and last switching prices 푃푖(푛)
of the 푖–th investor and how they are updated. In order to do so we need a pool of
predetermined stochastic i.i.d. variables
(
퐾∗푖 (푛)
)
1≤ 푖≤푀
, 푛 ∈ ℕ0 , with uniformly
distributed values in
[
퐾−, 퐾+
] ⊂ (0,∞), and i.i.d. variables (퐻∗푖 (푛))1≤ 푖≤푀 , 푛 ∈ ℕ0 ,
with uniformly distributed values in [퐻−, 퐻+] ⊂ (0,∞), from witch the investors may
choose cowardice and inaction thresholds, 퐾푖(푛) and 퐻푖(푛), whenever they switch po-
sitions. More precisely, we proceed as follows:
A0 Initialization (n = 0)
We choose 푝(0) = 푝start with arbitrary starting price level 푝start > 0 and mimic
the situation that all investors are ﬂat at time 푛 = −1 and decide randomly and
independently to go long (+1), short (−1) or ﬂat (0), at time 푛 = 0. Therefore
푠푖(0) := 푆
∗
푖 , 1 ≤ 푖 ≤푀 , where 푆∗푖 are predetermined i.i.d. random variables with
equally distributed values in {±1, 0} ,
휎(−1) = 0,
푃푖(0) = 푝(0) , 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푀 (initial last switching price),
퐻푖(0) = 퐻
∗
푖 (0) , 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푀 (initial price range threshold),
퐾푖(0) = 퐾
∗
푖 (0) , 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푀 (initial cowardice threshold),
푐푖(0) = 휉
∗
푖 ⋅퐾푖(0) , 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푀 (initial cowardice level; 휉∗푖 ∈ [0, 1] uniformly i.i.d.) .
Step n→ n + 1
The market price 푝(푛) can immediately be updated to 푝(푛 + 1) via (3).
A1 Cowardice level
Denoting [푥] ∈ ℤ the closest integer to 푥 ∈ ℝ , and 1퐴 the characteristic function
of the set A, let
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Δ푖(푛) :=
∣∣∣푠푖(푛) − [휎(푛)]∣∣∣ ∈ ℕ0 ,
(absolute distance of investor’s position to market sentiment)
Σ푖(푛) :=
{
Δ푖(푛) >
1
2
}
and
퐶푖(푛+ 1) := 푐푖(푛) + ℎΔ푖(푛) 1Σ푖(푛) = 푐푖(푛) + ℎΔ푖(푛) ,
i.e. we let the cowardice level 푐푖(푛) increase to 퐶푖(푛 + 1) (cf. (7) for the actual
update of 푐푖) in case the 푖–th investor’s state is not in accordance with the overall
market sentiment
[
휎(푛)
] (
i.e. in case 휔 ∈ Σ푖(푛)
)
and otherwise unchanged.
A2 Switching
Ψ푖(푛) :=
{
퐶푖(푛 + 1) > 퐾푖(푛)
}
,
Φ푖(푛) :=
{
푝(푛+ 1) /∈
[
푃푖(푛)
/(
1 +퐻푖(푛)
)
, 푃푖(푛)
(
1 +퐻푖(푛)
)]}
,
Θ푖(푛) := Ψ푖(푛) ∪ Φ푖(푛) .
The 푖–th investor switches his position only on Θ푖(푛), i.e. whenever his individ-
ual cowardice level increases over his cowardice threshold
(
휔 ∈ Ψ푖(푛)
)
or, if the
updated price leaves his individual price range of comfort
(
휔 ∈ Φ푖(푛)
)
.
To be more precise, in case of breakout the investors act pro–cyclic, i.e. they
increase their position in case of bullish breakout and decrease their position in
case of bearish breakout.
If on the other hand this is not the case, i.e. on Φ푐푖(푛), but the investor’s cowardice
threshold is broken, i.e. on Ψ푖(푛), he will move his position one step in the direc-
tion of the market sentiment, i.e. to
(
푠푖(푛)− 푠푖푔푛
(
푠푖(푛)−
[
휎(푛)
]))
1Ψ푖(푛)∩Φ푐푖 (푛) .
Let
Φup푖 (푛) :=
{
푝(푛 + 1) > 푃푖(푛)
(
1 +퐻푖(푛)
)}
,
Φdown푖 (푛) :=
{
푝(푛 + 1) < 푃푖(푛)
/ (
1 +퐻푖(푛)
)}
,
푠푖(푛+ 1) := 푠푖(푛) 1Θ푐
푖
(푛) +
(
푠푖(푛)− sign
(
푠푖(푛)−
[
휎(푛)
]))
1Ψ푖(푛)∩Φ푐푖 (푛)
+
(
푠푖(푛) + 1
)
1Φup
푖
(푛)
+
(
푠푖(푛)− 1
)
1Φdown
푖
(푛) .
(5)
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Equivalently, the update of the 푖−th investor reads as follows
푠푖(푛 + 1) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
푠푖(푛) , if 휔 /∈ Θ푖(푛) (no action)
(comfort price range left: act pro–cyclic)
푠푖(푛) + 1 , if 휔 ∈ Φ푖(푛) and 푝(푛 + 1) > 푃푖(푛)
(
1 +퐻푖(푛)
)
푠푖(푛)− 1 , if 휔 ∈ Φ푖(푛) and 푝(푛 + 1) < 푃푖(푛)
/(
1 +퐻푖(푛)
)
(cowardice action: move towards market sentiment)
푠푖(푛) + 1 , if 휔 ∈ Ψ푖(푛) ∩ Φ푐푖(푛) and 푠푖(푛) <
[
휎(푛)
]
푠푖(푛)− 1 , if 휔 ∈ Ψ푖(푛) ∩ Φ푐푖(푛) and 푠푖(푛) >
[
휎(푛)
]
A3 Updates
Only in case the 푖-th investor switched his position, i.e. on Θ푖(푛), the last switching
price 푃푖, the cowardice threshold 퐾푖 and the comfort price range 퐻푖 have to be
updated. Otherwise they are left unchanged:
푃푖(푛 + 1) := 푝(푛+ 1) 1Θ푖(푛) + 푃푖(푛) 1Θ푐푖 (푛) , (6)
퐾푖(푛 + 1) := 퐾
∗
푖 (푛 + 1) 1Θ푖(푛) + 퐾푖(푛) 1Θ푐푖 (푛) ,
퐻푖(푛+ 1) := 퐻
∗
푖 (푛+ 1) 1Θ푖(푛) + 퐻푖(푛) 1Θ푐푖 (푛) .
The new cowardice level is reset to zero at switching and otherwise raised to
퐶푖(푛 + 1):
푐푖(푛+ 1) := 퐶푖(푛+ 1) 1Θ푐
푖
(푛) . (7)
2.2 Markov property
As already noted, we assume the random variables 푆∗푖 , 퐾
∗
푖 (푛) and 퐻
∗
푖 (푛) as
predetermined and the associated 휎–algebra
풢0 := 휎 (푆∗푖 , 퐾∗푖 (푛) , 퐻∗푖 (푛) : 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푀 , 푛 ≥ 0)
is known at time zero. We set
ℱ푛 = 휎
(
푍∗푘 : 0 ≤ 푘 ≤ 푛
) ∪ 풢0 ,
where 푍∗푘 = Δ푊 (푘) is the driving news process (cf. (3)). Hence
푓(푛) :=
(
푝(푛) , 푠푖(푛) , 휎(푛− 1) , 푐푖(푛) , 푃푖(푛) , 퐾푖(푛) , 퐻푖(푛)
)
1≤ 푖≤푀
(8)
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is ℱ푛–measurable for all 푛 ≥ 0 by induction. Furthermore, the conditional law of 푓(푛)
given ℱ푛−1 depends only on 푓(푛 − 1), yielding a Markov chain. By assuming 풢0 to be
given, the underlying probability space
(
Ω,풜,ℙ) is generated only by the news process
푍∗푛 , 푛 ≥ 0.
2.3 Numerical results for Model A
We ﬁx parameters similarly as the ones in Cross et al. [6], i.e.
푀 = 100 , 푝start = 5000 , 훿 = 0.05 ,
휅 = 0.15 ,
√
2ℎ = 10−2 , or ℎ = 5 ⋅ 10−5 ,
and 퐼퐾 :=
[
퐾−, 퐾+
]
= [0.001, 0.003] ,
퐼퐻 :=
[
퐻−, 퐻+
]
= [0.004, 0.02] ,
i.e. we have comfort price range thresholds between 0.4% and 2.0% .
(9)
The simulation in Figure 2 shows how trends (i.e. several movements in one direction
interrupted by minor corrections) can be obtained with this new model. The price
process 푝(푛) (in bold face) exaggerates the movements of the fair market price process
푝푓(푛) (in light) – see (3) and (4). Furthermore sharp price adjustments can be observed
every now and then, which are not obviously triggered by respective movements in the
fair market price.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
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5800
Model A: steps = 10000, M = 100
Figure 2: Trend behavior
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Figure 3 shows the same simulation as above, but instead of the price process 푝(푛) we
plot the corresponding investors’ sentiment 휎(푛) (scaled by a factor 푀 to see the total
amount of open positions) (in bold) and besides also the MACD/signal lines (moving av-
erage convergence/divergence indicator with standard 26∣12∣9 periods) of this simulation
(scaled by a factor 25).
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
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−400
−200
0
200
400
600
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Model A: steps = 10000, M = 100
Figure 3: MACD and sentiment of Fig. 2
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Model A: steps = 10000, M = 100
Figure 4: Alternating sentiment moves of
Fig. 5
In the simulation of our Model A given in Figures 4 and 5 exaggerations to the upper
and lower side interchange, yielding non trend behavior.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
4800
4900
5000
5100
5200
5300
5400
Model A: steps = 10000, M = 100
Figure 5: Non trend behavior
Looking at the corresponding investors’ sentiment 휎(푛) (in Figure 4 bold), we see even
interchanging of trend patterns on a lower time scale. Again the price process 푝(푛) (in
bold in Figure 5) exaggerates the movements of the fair market price process 푝푓 (푛) (in
light).
The next simulation of Model A in Figures 6 and 7 shows the price development on
a much longer time period than before (100000 steps versus 10000 before). In this
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simulation one problem of Model A gets obvious: the market price may deviate from
the fair price over all bounds as time proceeds. Similarly the sentiment may grow over
all bounds. This is clearly unsatisfactory. We therefore introduce Model A*.
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Model A: steps = 100000, M = 100
Figure 6: Long simulation of Model A
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4000
Model A: steps = 100000, M = 100
Figure 7: Corresponding sentiment
2.4 The Model A*
To overcome the above problem we let our investors decrease their position (both long
or short) at a faster pace than the pace used to establish the position, at least once the
absolute value of the position has increased over a certain individual risk level 푅푖 > 0.
A0* Initialization
The initialization of our traders works exactly as for Model A in A0, except for
the initialization of an individual risk level
푅푖 := 휚/2 +
[ ∣휚 ⋅ 휂∗푖 ∣ ] , 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푀 ,
where 휂∗푖 are i.i.d. standard Gaussian variables and 휚 > 0 is a parameter.
Step n→ n + 1:
A1* Cowardice level
The cowardice levels are chosen as in A1.
A2* Switching
The sets Θ푖(푛) , Ψ푖(푛) and Φ푖(푛) determining the instances when the positions get
switched remain unchanged as in A2. However the update of the 푖−th investor
reads as follows
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푠푖(푛+1) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
푠푖(푛) , if 휔 /∈ Θ푖(푛) (no action)
(comfort price range left: act pro–cyclic, single action)
푠푖(푛) + 1 , if 휔 ∈ Φ푖(푛), 푝(푛+ 1) > 푃푖(푛)
(
1 +퐻푖(푛)
)
and 푠푖(푛) ≥ −푅푖
푠푖(푛)− 1 , if 휔 ∈ Φ푖(푛), 푝(푛+ 1) < 푃푖(푛)
/(
1 +퐻푖(푛)
)
and 푠푖(푛) ≤ 푅푖
(comfort price range left: act pro–cyclic, double action)
푠푖(푛) + 2 , if 휔 ∈ Φ푖(푛), 푝(푛+ 1) > 푃푖(푛)
(
1 +퐻푖(푛)
)
and 푠푖(푛) < −푅푖
푠푖(푛)− 2 , if 휔 ∈ Φ푖(푛), 푝(푛+ 1) < 푃푖(푛)
/(
1 +퐻푖(푛)
)
and 푠푖(푛) > 푅푖
(cowardice action: move towards market sentiment)
푠푖(푛) + 1 , if 휔 ∈ Ψ푖(푛) ∩ Φ푐푖(푛) and 푠푖(푛) <
[
휎(푛)
]
푠푖(푛)− 1 , if 휔 ∈ Ψ푖(푛) ∩ Φ푐푖(푛) and 푠푖(푛) >
[
휎(푛)
]
A3* Updates
The updates are again performed as in Model A, according to A3.
2.5 Numerical simulation of Model A*
In Figures 8 and 9 we see a simulation of Model A* corresponding to the parameters
chosen in Subsection 2.3 with additionally
휚 = 20 .
We also take exactly the same driving news process
(
푍∗푛
)
푛≤106
as was used to obtain
Figures 6 and 7.
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Model A*: steps = 100000, M = 100
Figure 8:Long simulation of Model A∗
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Figure 9:Corresponding sentiment
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One can see that the deviation of market price and fair market price is, as hoped for,
much less in the simulation of Model A*. A direct comparison of the distribution for(
푝(푛)
/
푝푓 (푛)
)−1 of Model A and Model A* along that sample path is depicted in Figures
10 and 11, respectively.
−0.5 −0.25 0 0.25 0.5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Model A: steps = 100000, M = 100
Figure 10:Distribution of
(
푝(푛)
/
푝푓 (푛)
)− 1
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Model A*: steps = 100000, M = 100
Figure 11:Distribution of
(
푝(푛)
/
푝푓 (푛)
)− 1
The deviations over 0.2 for Model A increase even more as time proceeds and do not
seem to converge. However, as we will see later in Subsection 4.2, this distribution
stabilizes for Model A*.
3 The Model B
In the long run the deviation of the price process 푝(푛) and the fair market price process
푝푓(푛) is not bounded in our Model A. Although Model A* already ﬁxed this problem to
some extend, we here try a completely diﬀerent ansatz.
3.1 Construction of the model
To do so, besides the traders of Model A, in Model B we also introduce fundamental
investors.
The fundamental investors on the one hand should act on a larger time scale and on the
other hand every now and then have the possibility to observe the fair market price (at
least approximately) and adjust their investment accordingly. This way it is guaranteed
that the market price will not deviate from the fair price in the long run. The properties
of the fundamental investors are stated at the end of the introduction.
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We denote the number of fundamental investors by 푀˜ . Say 푠˜푗(푛) ∈ ℤ , 푗 = 1, . . . , 푀˜ ,
is the state of the 푗–th fundamental investor and
휎˜(푛) =
1
푀˜
푀˜∑
푗=1
푠˜푗(푛)
is their average grade of investment. With
휎ˆ(푛) =
1
푀 + 푀˜
⎛
⎝ 푀∑
푖=1
푠푖(푛) +
푀˜∑
푗=1
푠˜푗(푛)
⎞
⎠
we measure the total sentiment. Again Δ휎ˆ(푛) = 휎ˆ(푛) − 휎ˆ(푛 − 1) measures the most
recent change in market sentiment. Similarly as in (3) we obtain a new price process
푝˜(푛) , 푛 ∈ ℕ0 , which is updated according to
푝˜(푛 + 1) = 푝˜(푛) ⋅ exp
(
훿
(√
ℎΔ푊 (푛) + 휅˜Δ휎ˆ(푛)
))
,
(
ℎ, 휅˜ > 0
)
(10)
i.e., besides the news process 푍∗푛 = Δ푊 (푛), 푛 ∈ ℕ , and traders, now also fundamental
investors enter the price building procedure.
The diﬀerence between the traders of Model A and the new fundamental investors is
their trading strategy, i.e., how they update their position. The fundamental investors
act anti–cyclic and are capable to observe the fair market price
푝˜푓 (푛+ 1) = 푝˜푓(푛) ⋅ exp
(
훿
√
ℎΔ푊 (푛)
)
, (11)
at least approximately. They are not inﬂuenced by market sentiment of the traders but
they do react on cowardice in reaction to the sentiment 휎˜(푛) within all fundamental
investors. Their relative position opposed to other investors increases with the distance
of the actual market price to the fair market price (anti–cyclic action). This is again
modeled through a price range of comfort(
푃˜푗(푛)
/(
1 + 퐻˜푗(푛)
)
, 푃˜푗(푛) ⋅
(
1 + 퐻˜푗(푛)
))
,
where 푃˜푗(푛) is the last switching price of the 푗–th fundamental investor, and 퐻˜푗(푛) ∈[
퐻˜−, 퐻˜+
] ⊂ (0,∞) is a measure for the length of that price range.
퐻˜푗(푛) is as before chosen at random every time the position gets switched out of a pool
of i.i.d. variables
(
퐻˜∗푗 (푛)
)
1≤ 푗≤ 푀˜
, 푛 ∈ ℕ0 , with uniformly distributed values in[
퐻˜−, 퐻˜+
]⊂ (0,∞). Similarly, at switching time the individual threshold for the cow-
ardice level of the 푗–th fundamental investor, 퐾˜푗(푛), is chosen at random out of a
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pool of i.i.d. variables
(
퐾˜∗푗 (푛)
)
1≤ 푗≤ 푀˜
, 푛 ∈ ℕ0 , with uniformly distributed values in[
퐾˜−, 퐾˜+
] ⊂ (0,∞).
Compared to the respective interval for the traders
[
퐻−, 퐻−
]
we choose 퐻˜− = 훽퐻− and
퐻˜+ = 훽퐻+ with some parameter 훽 > 1 , which guarantees that fundamental investors
act on a longer time scale. Similarly, the respective cowardice thresholds in
[
퐾˜−, 퐾˜+
]
are chosen scaled with the factor 훽 larger compared with the one of the traders, i.e.
퐾˜− = 훽퐾− and 퐾˜+ = 훽퐾+. Together with the state variables inherited from Model
A we obtain 5푀 + 5푀˜ + 3 state variables(
푝˜(푛), 푠푖(푛), 휎(푛), 푐푖(푛), 푃푖(푛), 퐾푖(푛), 퐻푖(푛), 푠˜푗(푛), 휎˜(푛), 푐˜푗(푛), 푃˜푗(푛), 퐾˜푗(푛), 퐻˜푗(푛)
)
1≤ 푖≤푀 ,
1≤ 푗≤ 푀˜, 푛≥ 0
.
B0 Initialization (n = 0)
We choose 푝˜(0) = 푝start with arbitrary starting price level 푝start and mimic the situa-
tion that all investors are ﬂat at time 푛 = −1 and decide randomly and independent
to go long (+1), short (−1) or ﬂat (0), at time 푛 = 0. Therefore 푠푖(0) := 푆∗푖 , 1 ≤
푖 ≤ 푀 , 푠˜푗(0) = 푆˜∗푗 , 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푀˜ , where 푆∗푖 , 푆˜∗푗 are predetermined i.i.d. random
variables with equally distributed values in {±1, 0} ,
휎(−1) = 0 , 휎˜(−1) = 0 and furthermore for the
traders:
푃푖(0) = 푝˜(0) , 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푀 (initial last switching price) ,
퐻푖(0) = 퐻
∗
푖 (0) , 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푀 (initial price range threshold) ,
퐾푖(0) = 퐾
∗
푖 (0) , 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푀 (initial cowardice threshold) ,
푐푖(0) = 휉
∗
푖 ⋅퐾푖(0) , 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푀 (initial cowardice level; 휉∗푖 ∈ [0, 1] uniformly i.i.d.) .
fundamental investors:
푃˜푗(0) = 푝˜(0) , 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푀˜ (initial last switching price) ,
퐻˜푗(0) = 퐻˜
∗
푗 (0) , 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푀˜ (initial price range threshold) ,
퐾˜푗(0) = 퐾˜
∗
푗 (0) , 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푀˜ (initial cowardice threshold) ,
푐˜푗(0) = 휉˜
∗
푗 ⋅ 퐾˜푗(0) , 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푀˜ (initial cowardice level; 휉˜∗푗 ∈ [0, 1] uniformly i.i.d) ,
푁˜푗 = 휁˜
∗
푗 , 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푀˜ (noise level for fair market observation;
휁˜∗푗 standard Gaussian i.i.d.) .
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Step n→ n + 1
The market price 푝˜(푛) and the fair market price 푝˜푓(푛) are updated via (10) and (11) to
푝˜(푛+ 1) and 푝˜푓 (푛+ 1).
The update of the traders 푖 = 1, . . . ,푀 is exactly as in Model A, with only 푝(푛+ 1)
replaced by 푝˜(푛 + 1) witch evolves according to (10). Hence only the update of the
fundamental investors is described in the sequel.
B1 Cowardice level
Let Δ˜푗(푛) :=
∣∣∣푠˜푗(푛) − [휎˜(푛)]∣∣∣ ,
Σ˜푗(푛) :=
{
Δ˜푗(푛) >
1
2
}
and
퐶˜푗(푛+ 1) := 푐˜푗(푛) + ℎ Δ˜푗(푛) .
The cowardice level 푐˜푗(푛) of the 푗–th fundamental investor increases to 퐶˜푗(푛+ 1)
(cf. (14) below) if his state is not in accordance with the sentiment of all funda-
mental investors.
Fundamental investors will only consider new positions, once the actual market price
푝˜(푛+ 1) is far from the fair price 푝˜푓(푛+ 1). This gap is measured by
푞 = 푞(푛 + 1) := max
{
푝˜(푛 + 1)
푝˜푓(푛+ 1)
,
푝˜푓(푛+ 1)
푝˜(푛 + 1)
}
≥ 1 . (12)
Since each fundamental investor can only observe the fair price approximately, we intro-
duce a noisy variant of 푞, i.e.
푞푗(푛+ 1) := 푞(푛+ 1) + 휀 ⋅ 푁˜푗 , 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푀˜ , 푛 ∈ ℕ0 ,
for some parameter 휀 > 0. The switching decision of the 푗–th fundamental investor will
now depend on whether the market price is close to the fair price, i.e. on Λ˜close푗 (푛), or
far from the fair price, i.e. on Λ˜far푗 (푛) , where
Λ˜close푗 (푛) :=
{
푞푗(푛+ 1) ≤ 훾
}
and Λ˜far푗 (푛) :=
{
푞푗(푛+ 1) > 훾
}
,
for some parameter 훾 > 1 building a threshold.
Whereas in Λ˜far푗 (푛) the 푗–th fundamental investor may build new positions and reduce
old positions according to market movements, in Λ˜close푗 (푛) he will only reduce his old
positions once a signal occurs.
The amount of positions the 푗-th fundamental investor is buying/selling at switching
time should also depend on the gap between actual market price and fair price. It will
be determined by the function
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푓(푞) := max
{
1,
[
훼(푞 − 1)]} , 푞 ≥ 1 ,
where 훼 > 0 is a parameter. Note that 푓(푞) ∈ ℕ for 푞 ≥ 1. If the actual market
price is far away from the fair price, the fundamental investor will therefore invest more
aggressively.
B2 Switching
Let Ψ˜푗(푛) :=
{
퐶˜푗(푛+ 1) > 퐾˜푗(푛)
}
, (cowardice action trigger)
Φ˜푗(푛) :=
{
푝˜(푛+ 1) /∈
[
푃˜푗(푛)
/(
1 + 퐻˜푗(푛)
)
, 푃˜푗(푛)
(
1 + 퐻˜푗(푛)
)]}
,
(comfort price range left)
Φ˜up푗 (푛) :=
{
푝˜(푛+ 1) > 푃˜푗(푛)
(
1 + 퐻˜푗(푛)
)}
, (to upside)
Φ˜down푗 (푛) :=
{
푝˜(푛+ 1) < 푃˜푗(푛)
/(
1 + 퐻˜푗(푛)
)}
, (to downside)
Ξ˜up(푛) :=
{
푝˜(푛+ 1) > 푝˜푓 (푛+ 1)
}
, (market above fair price)
Ξ˜down(푛) :=
{
푝˜(푛+ 1) ≤ 푝˜푓(푛 + 1)
}
. (market below fair price)
The switching set for which selling or buying actions are triggered is the following:
Θ˜푗(푛) :=
[
Λ˜far푗 (푛) ∩
(
Φ˜푗(푛) ∪ Ψ˜푗(푛)
)]
∪˙
[
Λ˜close푗 (푛) ∩
[({
푠˜푗(푛) ∕= 0
} ∩ Ψ˜푗(푛))
∪
({
푠˜푗(푛) > 0
} ∩ Φ˜up푗 (푛))
∪
({
푠˜푗(푛) < 0
} ∩ Φ˜down푗 (푛))
] ]
.
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We distinguish ﬁve disjoint cases for the update of 푠˜푗(푛):
(i) for 휔 /∈ Θ˜푗(푛) let 푠˜푗(푛+ 1) := 푠˜푗(푛) (no action) ,
(ii) for 휔 ∈ Λ˜far푗 (푛) ∩ Ξ˜up(푛) let (only short positions supported)
푠˜푗(푛+1) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
(comfort price range left:)
min
(
0, 푠˜푗(푛) − 푓
(
푞푗(푛 + 1)
))
, if 휔 ∈ Φ˜up푗 (푛)
(bullish breakout; anti–cyclic action)
min
(
0, 푠˜푗(푛) + 푓
(
푞푗(푛+ 1)
))
, if 휔 ∈ Φ˜down푗 (푛)
(bearish breakout; anti–cyclic action)
(cowardice action:)
min
(
0, 푠˜푗(푛) + 1
)
, if 휔 ∈ Ψ˜푗(푛) ∩ Φ˜푐푗(푛) and 푠˜푗(푛) <
[
휎˜(푛)
]
min
(
0, 푠˜푗(푛) − 1
)
, if 휔 ∈ Ψ˜푗(푛) ∩ Φ˜푐푗(푛) and 푠˜푗(푛) >
[
휎˜(푛)
]
,
(iii) for 휔 ∈ Λ˜far푗 (푛) ∩ Ξ˜down(푛) let (only long positions supported)
푠˜푗(푛+1) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
(comfort price range left:)
max
(
0, 푠˜푗(푛) − 푓
(
푞푗(푛 + 1)
))
, if 휔 ∈ Φ˜up푗 (푛)
(bullish breakout; anti–cyclic action)
max
(
0, 푠˜푗(푛) + 푓
(
푞푗(푛+ 1)
))
, if 휔 ∈ Φ˜down푗 (푛)
(bearish breakout; anti–cyclic action)
(cowardice action:)
max
(
0, 푠˜푗(푛) + 1
)
, if 휔 ∈ Ψ˜푗(푛) ∩ Φ˜푐푗(푛) and 푠˜푗(푛) <
[
휎˜(푛)
]
max
(
0, 푠˜푗(푛) − 1
)
, if 휔 ∈ Ψ˜푗(푛) ∩ Φ˜푐푗(푛) and 푠˜푗(푛) >
[
휎˜(푛)
]
,
(iv) for 휔 ∈ Λ˜close푗 (푛) ∩ {푠˜푗(푛) > 0} (long position possibly reduced)
푠˜푗(푛+1) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
max
(
0, 푠˜푗(푛) − 푓
(
푞푗(푛+ 1)
))
, if 휔 ∈ Φ˜up푗 (푛) ,
(bullish breakout; anti–cyclic action)
푠˜푗(푛) − 1 , if 휔 ∈
(
Φ˜up푗 (푛)
)푐
∩ Ψ˜푗(푛) . (cowardice action)
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(v) for 휔 ∈ Λ˜close푗 (푛) ∩ {푠˜푗(푛) < 0} (short position possibly reduced)
푠˜푗(푛+1) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
min
(
0, 푠˜푗(푛) + 푓
(
푞푗(푛+ 1)
))
, if 휔 ∈ Φ˜down푗 (푛) ,
(bearish breakout; anti–cyclic action)
푠˜푗(푛) + 1 , if 휔 ∈
(
Φ˜down푗 (푛)
)푐
∩ Ψ˜푗(푛) . (cowardice action)
Comments:
ad (ii): If 휔 ∈ Λ˜far푗 (푛) the fundamental investors can buy and sell freely according
to their anti–cyclic strategy, i.e. in case of bullish breakout
(
휔 ∈ Φ˜up푗 (푛)
)
they sell and in case of bearish breakout
(
휔 ∈ Φ˜down푗 (푛)
)
they buy stocks.
If only cowardice action is triggered
(
휔 ∈ Ψ˜푗(푛) ∩ Φ˜푗(푛)푐
)
, the position of
the 푗–th fundamental investor is moved one step towards common sentiment
of the fundamental investors. Taking the minimum relative to 0 guarantees
that for 휔 ∈ Ξ˜up(푛) only short positions are possible. This is a consequence
of the anti–cyclic strategy and the fact that the market price is above the
fair price.
ad (iii): similar as (ii)
ad (iv) and (v):
for 휔 ∈ Λ˜close푗 (푛) only reductions of open positions are allowed, i.e. for{
푠˜푗(푛) > 0
}
only selling and for
{
푠˜푗(푛) < 0
}
only buying is possible, once
a cowardice action or a breakout giving this anti–cyclic action is triggered.
B3 Updates
In case the 푗–th fundamental investor switched his position, the last switching
price 푃˜푗 , the comfort price range 퐻˜푗 and the cowardice threshold 퐾˜푗 has to be
updated,
푃˜푗(푛+ 1) := 푝˜(푛+ 1) 1Θ˜푗(푛) + 푃˜푗(푛) 1Θ˜푐푗(푛) ,
퐾˜푗(푛+ 1) := 퐾˜
∗
푗 (푛 + 1) 1Θ˜푗(푛) + 퐾˜푗(푛) 1Θ˜푐푗(푛) ,
퐻˜푗(푛+ 1) := 퐻˜
∗
푗 (푛+ 1) 1Θ˜푗(푛) + 퐻˜푗(푛) 1Θ˜푐푗(푛) ,
(13)
and the new cowardice level is reset to zero at switching or otherwise updated
푐˜푗(푛+ 1) := 퐶˜푗(푛 + 1) 1Θ˜푐
푗
(푛) . (14)
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3.2 Numerical results for Model B
In this subsection, numerical simulation of Model B with the same underlying news
process as was used in Subsection 2.3 is given. We used the same parameters as in (9)
and additionally
푀˜ = 100 , 훼 = 20 , 훽 = 5 , 훾 = 1.05 , 휀 = 0.005 , 휅˜ = 0.3 .
In Figure 12 we show a sample trajectory of Model B. Exaggerations can still be observed
(in bold: actual market price; in light: fair price).
The fundamental investors (dashed–bold: 푀˜ ⋅ 휎˜; see Figure 13) enter, when the market
price is too far from the fair price. In bold: 푀 ⋅ 휎 (traders); in light: (푀 + 푀˜) ⋅ 휎ˆ (all
investors).
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Model B: steps = 100000, M = 100, Mtilde = 100
Figure 12: Long simulation of Model B
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Figure 13: Corresponding sentiment of dif-
ferent investors
In Figure 14 we see the distribution of
(
푝˜(푛)
/
푝˜푓(푛)
) − 1 for the sample path of Figure
12. Similarly as Model A* (see Figure 11), Model B follows the fair price more closely
than Model A (see Figure 10).
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Figure 14: Distribution of
(
푝˜(푛)
/
푝˜푓(푛)
)− 1
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Figure 15: Distribution of
(
푝˜(푛)
/
푝˜푓(푛)
)− 1
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3.3 The Model B*
If we combine the traders of Model A* (see Subsection 2.4) with the fundamental in-
vestors of Model B we obtain Model B* (cf. Figures 15, 16 and 17).
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Figure 16: Long simulation of Model B*
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Figure 17: Corresponding sentiment of dif-
ferent investors
This model follows the fair price the closest, but still allows sharp price adjustments and
also trends with cumulating sentiment.
4 Statistics of sample paths
4.1 Short term simulation
The statistics produced here relates to the same sample path with 100000 steps that was
already used in the sections before. Nevertheless, the distributions and autocorrelations
seem to be extremely stable when other samples of the news process 푍∗푛 , 푛 ∈ ℕ , are
used. Also, quite remarkably, the presented distributions do almost not change when
other samples of the remaining involved processes 푆∗푖 , 퐾
∗
푖 (푛) and 퐻
∗
푖 (푛) are used. Even
the price process evolution changes only marginally when a ﬁxed sample of the news
process, but variant samples of the other involved processes are used.
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Short term statistics of Model 푨∗
Figure 18 shows the evolution of price returns after 푁 = 10 periods:
ret푁 (푛) =
푝(푛)
푝(푛−푁) − 1 , 푛 ≥ 푁 .
The data for the actual market price (dashed–light) versus the fair market price (bold)
are compared.
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Figure 18: Evolution of price returns ret10
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Figure 19: Price return distribution ret10
Figure 19 exhibits the histograms of price returns after 10 periods (data for the ac-
tual market price (bold) versus the fair market price (dashed–light)). The diﬀerence is
only marginal although Figure 18 shows numerous breakouts of the actual market price
returns.
Figure 20 shows the activity (in percent) of the investors (traders). The next Figure 21
shows the autocorrelation function of the one period price returns 푋푛 = ret1(푛). We
see that 푋푛 and 푋푛−푚 for 푚 ≥ 2 are completely uncorrelated.
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Figure 20: Activity of the investors
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Figure 21: Autocorrelation of ret1
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In Figure 22 the evolution of the normalized time averaged volatility (푁 = 26 periods)
is given:
vola푁 (푛) =
√√√⎷ 1
푁
푛∑
푖=푛−푁+1
(
푝(푖)
/
푚(푖)− 1
)2
, 푛 ≥ 2푁 , where 푚(푛) = 1
푁
푛∑
푖=푛−푁+1
푝(푖) .
Note that due to normalization vola푁(푛) is scale invariant, i.e. a constant multiple of
the price process 푝 would produce the same volatility. This is essential for a possible
convergence of the distributions as the simulated amount of steps gets large.
Again the data for the actual market price (dashed–light) versus the fair market price
(bold) are compared. Clearly, large volatility every now and then is only seen in the data
for the actual market price, but not in the fair market price data (volatility clustering).
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Figure 22: Short term volatility evolution
vola26
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Figure 23: Distribution of short term volatil-
ity vola26
The distribution of the time averaged volatility vola26 is given in Figure 23 (fair price:
dashed–light; market price: bold). Similarly, Figures 24 and 25 show the evolution and
distribution for the long term volatility vola1000, averaged over 푁 = 1000 periods. As
for the short term volatility vola26, we again see that cumulation of high volatility is
much more supported by the actual market price (in Figure 24 dashed–light; in Figure
25 bold) than by to the fair market price data.
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Figure 24: Evolution of vola1000
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Figure 25: Distribution of vola1000
Short term statistics of Model B
The following ﬁgures for Model B are produced in complete analogy to the ones for
Model A* before hand. Not only the meaning of the ﬁgures, but also the statistical
interpretation has many similarities.
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Figure 26: Evolution of price returns ret10
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Figure 27: Price return distribution ret10
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In Figures 26 and 27 the evolution and distribution of price returns after 10 periods are
compared (in Figure 26 data for the actual market price (dashed–light) versus the fair
market price (bold); in Figure 27 vice versa, e.g. the actual market price data is printed
in bold).
Figure 28 shows the activity (in percent) of the traders (dashed–light) and the funda-
mental investors (bold). The interpretation of the autocorrelation function in Figure 29
is as for Figure 21.
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Figure 28: Activity of the investors
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Figure 29: Autocorrelation of ret1
Figures 30 and 32 show again the evolution of short and long term volatility, respectively
(bold: fair price, dashed–light: actual market price).
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Figure 30: Evolution of vola26
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Figure 31: Distribution of vola26
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The distributions of short and long term volatilities are given in Figures 31 and 33 (bold:
actual market price; dashed–light: fair price).
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Figure 32: Evolution of vola1000
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Figure 33: Distribution of vola1000
While the data for price returns and short term volatility are almost identical for Model
A* and B, the long term volatility of model A* seems to support larger values (above
0.02) more than Model B.
4.2 Long term simulation
In case the distributions of our sample data converge as the number of simulated pe-
riods go to inﬁnity, this should show when we do long simulations. We therefore give
simulations with 10 million steps. For all models the same news process 푍∗푛 is used.
Long term statistics of Model 퐴 and 퐴∗
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Figure 34: Distribution of
(
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Figure 35: Distribution of vola1000
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Figure 36: Distribution of
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Figure 37: Distribution of vola1000
Long term statistics of Model B and B*
In Figures 34, 36, 38 and 40 we give the distribution of
(
푝(푛)
/
푝푓 (푛)
)− 1 that compares
market price and fair price for all four models. Models A* and B* support the center
area (where market price and fair price are close) with deviations up to 25%. On
the other hand Model B does support even deviations of 100% and more. As already
conjectured for Model A the deviation of market price and fair price apparently grows
without bounds, which is unrealistic. In eﬀect only Model A is not suitable for long
simulations.
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Figure 38: Distribution of
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Figure 39: Distribution of vola1000
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Figure 40: Distribution of
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Figure 41: Distribution of vola1000
The long time volatility distributions of Figures 35, 37, 39 and 41 (dashed–light: fair
price; bold: market price) do conﬁrm that Model A* supports high long term volatility
more than Model B. The distributions of Model A, A* and B* are extremely close. We
skip the distributions of vola26 because they are for all four models extremely close, as
were already Figures 23 and 31.
4.3 Matlab Code
The simulation of all four models is written in Matlab (the code is available on our
web site http://www.instmath.rwth-aachen.de/∼maier). The input is organized via a
parameter ﬁle (cf. Table 1), which allows for individual adjustments of all parameters.
Besides the statistics produced here also tick data of the price evolution can be simulated.⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
4 0 1 2 3 Number of Models, List of Models (0=A, 1=A*, 2=B, 3=B*)
100 100 20 M, tilde M, rho
20 5 5000 alpha, beta, p-start
0.15 0.3 1.05 0.05 kappa, tilde kappa, gamma, delta
0.001 0.003 0.004 0.02 K-, K+, H-, H+
0.00005 0.005 1 10000000 h, epsilon, FactorKH (factor scales similarly K+- and H+-), steps
0 Discrete (0=normally distributed, 1= discrete number generator)
1 Output Statistics (1=yes,0=no)
2 Output Mode (0= no, 1= write tick ﬁle, 2=write data, 3= both),
1 Output factor (scales the time when producing tick data)
1 Input Mode, (0=for random generator, 1=use input ﬁle, 2=write input ﬁle)
DAX.tick Output tick File
inputrandom.mat Input Random News Process Data
liste.mat Output Data
Table 1: Input ﬁle parameter.txt
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5 Conclusion
All models introduced here show typical stylized facts of real market date like e.g. fat
tails and volatility clustering. With the exception of Model A, our models also do not
deviate from the fair market price by too much, even in the long run.
Although the innovation process 푍∗푛 is standard Gaussian, the market price 푝(푛) is far
from behaving like geometric Brownian motion. The actions of the investors every now
and then yield short transition periods with sharp price adjustments. Even trend behav-
ior with short movements and long corrections can be observed. Clearly those features
would intensify, if the underlying news process would be perturbed by ”news–spikes”,
which usually occur in connection with the release of economic data. Also perturbing
the innovation process by a long term periodic function, representing economic cycles,
would probably even generate long term trend behavior of the market price.
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